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t Case No. 880355 
i Category No. 3 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from the dismissal of appellant's 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Third Judicial District 
Court. Jurisdiction lies in this Court under Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-2-2(3)(i) (1987)(Supp. 1988) because the conviction which 
caused the incarceration of which petitioner complains was for a 
first degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether petitioner is procedurally barred from 
seeking a Writ of Habeas Corpus by raising matters in the 
petition that he raised or should have raised on his direct 
appeal. 
2. Whether petitioner's trial and appellate counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance. 
3. Whether the prosecutor in petitioner's trial 
committed misconduct in his closing arguments and whether he 
withheld exculpatory evidence from petitioner before trial. 
4. Whether petitioner's additional claims raised in 
his supplemental brief, that he was denied access to the courts 
and that the trial judge was prejudiced, have any merit. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
For purposes of this brief, respondents rely on the 
following provisions: 
1. Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-203 (1978). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner was charged with criminal homicide, murder 
in the second degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann, S 76-5-203 (1978). He was convicted as charged in a 
jury trial held February 26,27,28, and March 1, 1985, in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, presiding. Petitioner was 
sentenced by Judge Frederick on March 25, 1985, to the Utah State 
Prison for a term of not less than five years and may be for 
life. Petitioner appealed that conviction and sentence to this 
Court in 1985 in case number 20629. The issues raised in that 
appeal were (1) ineffective assistance by trial counsel because 
she failed to object to the court giving a supplemental "Allen" 
instruction; (2) reversible error by the trial court in giving 
the "Allen" instruction; (3) insufficient evidence to support the 
guilty verdict; and (4) reversible error by the trial court in 
allowing the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable 
witness to be read into evidence at trial. This Court upheld 
petitioner's conviction in State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021 (Utah 
1987). 
On November 5, 1987, petitioner filed a Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging his incarceration. Even though 
in this circumstance such a petition should be for Post-
Conviction Relief, respondents will use the title given it by 
petitioner for the purposes of this brief. The case was assigned 
to the Honorable Frank G. Noel of the Third Judicial District 
Court. An evidentiary hearing was held in the matter on March 
25, 1988/ at which time petitioner called no witnesses and did 
not take the stand himself. The matter was argued by petitioner 
pro se and by an Assistant Attorney General but no sworn 
testimony or evidence was presented. Subsequent to the hearing, 
petitioner filed several "affidavits" and "supplemental 
traverses" in an attempt to support his claims. On October 20, 
1988, Judge Noel signed an Order dismissing petitioner's habeas 
corpus petition. On October 21, 1988, petitioner filed an 
objection to Judge Noel's Memorandum Decision; on October 28, 
1988/ petitioner filed a Motion for a Certificate of Probable 
Cause, a Motion for the Appointment of Counsel/ and a Notice of 
Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In this statement/ citations to the trial record are to 
the page numbers stamped on as the record numbers/ not to the 
reporter's pagination. 
On the afternoon of Saturday/ March 31/ 19849 George 
Givens/ also known as Greg Givens (Trial R. 691)
 # met Rickey 
Myers in downtown Salt Lake City. Myers was walking in the city# 
sight-seeing (Trial R. 381). He had arrived in Salt Lake City 
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the previous Wednesday (Trial R. 380) or Thursday (Trial R. 504). 
Givens told Myers of a nearby party that he was going to and 
asked Myers to come along (Trial R. 381). The two walked from 
the downtown area to Myers' truck (Trial R. 383), which was 
parked near the Holiday Inn at Redwood Road and North Temple 
(Trial R. 458). 
When they arrived at the party, which was in a duplex 
rented by Mike O'Mara (Trial R. 199-200,385), they discovered 
that there was another party next door (Trial R. 387). The party 
at Mike O'Mara's was attended by high school age youth (Trial R. 
387). The other party, in Pete Najera's half of the duplex 
(Trial R. 228), was attended by people ofvarying ages (Trial R. 
345). Myers felt more comfortable at Najera's party so he stayed 
there (Trial R. 387-8). Givens, meanwhile, went back and forth 
to both parties, which caused some minor resentment in 
petitioner's cousin at Najera's party (Trial R. 397). 
Petitioner was also at Najera's party (Trial R. 241, 
261, 344, 388, 606). He arrived at about 10:30 p.m. (Trial R. 
255, 606) with his second cousin, Leonard Fernandez (Trial R. 
257). Petitioner and Fernandez left after about fifteen minutes 
and went to La Frontera cafe until about 1:00 a.m. (Trial R. 
607). They then returned to Najera's party (Trial R. 609). 
There was no apparent dispute or trouble between petitioner and 
Givens during the party (Trial R. 231, 169, 347, 397). 
Myers met petitioner at the party and got close enough 
to see him, identify him (Trial R. 498), and remember him (Trial 
R. 388-9). While at the party, Myers drank some beer but never 
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-arrived at a state of intoxication or drunkenness" (Trial R. 
389-90). The party Mwas slowing down" at about 3:30 a.m. (Trial 
R. 401-2) so Myers and Givens decided to leave (Trial R. 402). 
Myers testified that he and Givens left the party 
through the front door of Najera's duplex (Trial R. 404). As 
Myers went through the door he saw "three gentlemen that opened 
the door" (Trial R. 405). The men were Givens, petitioner, and 
someone Myers recognized but did not know the name of (Trial R. 
405); however, Myers later identified him as Gilbert Najera or 
his brother, Steven Najera (Trial R. 424), who look very much 
alike (Trial R. 368, 468, 493). Petitioner claimed that he left 
with Leonard Fernandez prior to the shooting (Trial R. 615). 
Gilbert Najera also testified that petitioner left prior to the 
shooting (Trial R. 350-1). Fernandez testified that he left with 
petitioner (Trial R. 285) and that he did not hear a shot but he 
did see a body slumped over in the entry way (Trial R. 285, 305). 
He did not see a bullet hole or blood (Trial R. 305), but the 
body made no noise nor did it move (Trial R. 318). Furthermore, 
because Fernandez was wearing dark glasses he could not tell 
whether the body was a black or a white man (Trial R. 306). 
Petitioner testified that he saw no one lying in the entry way 
when he left with Fernandez (Trial R. 615). 
Myers testified that he came out of the door, shook 
petitioner's hand and thanked him for the good time and started 
toward his truck (Trial R. 409). Myers then glanced back to tell 
petitioner something and saw petitioner advance toward Givens 
(Trial R. 410). Petitioner, with a motion of his right hand 
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coming from his belt, said something like, "When you see your 
friends over there, give them this" (Trial R. 410). Myers then 
saw a muzzle flash from a revolver (Trial R. 410, 412) and saw 
Givens shot in the head (Trial R. 415). The revolver sounded 
like it was in the .30 caliber range (Trial R. 412) although 
Myers could only see that it was a blue steel revolver, and could 
not see the size of caliber it was (Trial R. 412). Petitioner 
then turned toward Myers, pointed the gun at him and asked 
something to the effect, "Would you like some of this, too?" 
(Trial R. 413). Myers turned and ran from the scene (Trial R. 
413). He did not go to his truck because he simply wanted to get 
out of the area and did not think of going to his truck (Trial R. 
414). 
Myers ran a short distance (Trial R. 413) then walked 
(Trial R. 453). He came to the railroad tracks (Trial R. 450) 
and followed them back downtown, walked to the bus depot, waited 
four or five minutes and then called the police (Trial R. 418). 
The police came to the bus depot and took him to the police 
station (Trial R. 419). Officer Opheikens, who picked Myers up 
at the bus depot, stated that Myers showed signs of shock and was 
"visibly shaken up and he rambled on the same as somebody who had 
been in a serious accident and had been shaken up, the same type 
behavior in his mannerisms" (Trial R. 531). Myers looked at 30 
to 40 photographs to identify who was with petitioner when he 
shot Givens in the head (Trial R. 423, 491). 
Officer John Johnson was assigned to the case and went 
to petitioner'8 home with Lieutenant Leonard and Detective Jim 
Leary to arrest petitioner concerning the homicide (Trial R. 
516). While Johnson was at petitioner's home he asked, and 
received, permission to search petitioner's car for a Hgun or 
bullets, anything related to the shooting" (Trial R. 479). 
Johnson "found one live round of .38 caliber ammunition on the 
floorboard" of the front passenger side of the vehicle he 
searched (Trial R. 480). The bullet had a solid lead slug that 
was unjacketed (Trial R. 480). 
At trial, petitioner testified that the bullet was 
dropped in his car in late February or early March when he went 
target practicing with a snubnose (Trial R. 636) .38 caliber 
pistol (Trial R. 596). Petitioner said he borrowed the gun from 
his nephew (Trial R. 630), Jonathan Twittle (Trial R. 637). One 
of petitioner's cousins, Willie Moore, testified that he and 
petitioner had gone target shooting in early 1984 and had gone in 
petitioner's black Chevy Chevelle and may have dropped some 
shells in the car (Trial R. 596-7). Moore also testified that 
petitioner had talked to him about testifying about the target 
shooting in the summer of 1984 (Trial R. 597). Petitioner 
testified that the car he was driving the night of the homicide 
was a black 1972 Chevrolet Chevelle (Trial R. 607), but 
introduced into evidence the registration for a Chevelle Malibu 
(Trial R. 608). He testified that he owned three other 
automobiles (Trial R. 617). Petitioner's cousin, Leonard 
Fernandez, testified that petitioner was driving a 1971 Chevelle 
with no damage on it that night and that the car was a Super 
Sport with a "CS or SS" on the body (Trial R. 93-94). The 
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officer testified that he searched a black 1974 Chevrolet Monte 
Carlo and recalled that it was unlocked when he searched (Trial 
R. 479). Another officer who was present during the search also 
testified that the vehicle searched was a black Chevrolet Monte 
Carlo (Trial R. 516). 
After the habeas corpus hearing, at which no sworn 
evidence was given, petitioner submitted "affidavits" saying that 
he had not been aware that the car searched was a Monte Carlo 
(Habeas R. 267-68, 352-53). He also sent "affidavits" 
purportedly from a Mark Velarde that a 1974 Monte Carlo which 
Velarde is "almost 100% sure" was parked at petitioner's house on 
April 1, 1984, belonged to a friend of Velarde's. The 
"affidavits" state that Velarde didn't know petitioner on April 
1, 1984, but he would have testified for him (Habeas R. 270-71, 
280-82, 289-90). None of these "affidavits" was executed before 
a subscribing witness. 
After the hearing, petitioner also submitted 
"affidavits" of his cousin, Chris Leonard Fernandez, who had 
testified at his trial, that the prosecution's rebuttal witness 
had a vendetta against petitioner's cousin's family (Habeas R. 
283-84). He also submitted -affidavits" from a Lorenzo Tuero who 
claims to be a part-time disc jockey at the Annex Bar where he 
never recalled seeing petitioner, and to have been employed at La 
Frontera and to have seen petitioner there often. The 
"affidavit" states that Tuero never saw petitioner socializing 
with Eli Archuleta, the State's rebuttal witness (Habeas R. 352-
56). Finally, petitioner submitted "affidavits" from Ronald 
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Craig Warren who claims to have been incarcerated with both 
petitioner and Archuleta at the Utah State Prison and to have 
heard Archuleta say that he had lied at petitioner's trial 
(Habeas R. 363-70). Again, none of these "affidavits" were 
executed before a subscribing witness. None of the people who 
supposedly prepared these "affidavits" were called to testify at 
petitioner's habeas hearing (Habeas R. 264). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Petitioner has taken a direct appeal from his 
conviction and does not now raise any issues which were not or 
could not have been raised in that appeal. 
Petitioner's claim of a violation of his constitutional 
rights is not supported by the record of either his trial or his 
habeas hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT 
PETITIONER COULD AND SHOULD HAVE RAISED ALL 
ISSUES CONCERNING HIS CONVICTION ON HIS 
INITIAL DIRECT APPEAL. 
Petitioner asserts that the District Court erred in 
dismissing his habeas corpus petition. This assertion is 
roeritless. 
It is well settled law in Utah that if alleged errors 
could have been raised on direct appeal, this Court is "precluded 
under basic principles of appellate review from addressing them 
now," Bundy v. Deland# 763 P.2d 803, 804 (Utah 1988). In stating 
a post-conviction claim, a petitioner must allege an "obvious 
injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a 
constitutional right in the trial of a matter;. . .H Ld. 
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This Court in Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 
1983), clearly emphasized the standard for habeas corpus review; 
It is therefore well settled in this state 
that allegations of error that could have 
been but were not raised on appeal from a 
criminal conviction cannot be raised by 
habeas corpus or postconviction review, 
except in unusual circumstances. 
A much-quoted statement of the type of 
errors that are and are not cognizable by 
habeas corpus is the following from this 
Court's unanimous opinion in Brown v. Turner, 
21 Utah 2d 96, 98-99, 40 P.2d 968, 969 (1968) 
(Crockett, C.J.): 
[Habeas corpus] is an extraordinary 
remedy which is properly invocable 
only when the court had no 
jurisdiction over the person or the 
offense, or where the requirements 
of law have been so disregarded 
that the party is substantially and 
effectively denied due process of 
law, or where some such fact is 
shown that it would be 
unconscionable not to re-examine 
the conviction. If the contention 
of error is something which is 
known or should be known to the 
party at the time the judgment was 
entered, it must be reviewed in the 
manner and within the time 
permitted by regular prescribed 
procedure, or the judgment becomes 
final and is not subject to further 
attack, except in some such unusual 
circumstance as we have mentioned 
above. Were it otherwise, the 
regular rules of procedure 
governing appeals and the 
limitations of time specified 
therein would be rendered impotent. 
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d at 1104-05 (bracketed material and 
emphasis in original). The standard of review was further 
detailed by this Court in Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 
(Utah 1988), as follows: 
.in-
On appeal from denial of habeas corpus 
relief, "we survey the record in the light 
most favorable to the findings and judgment; 
and we will not reverse if there is a 
reasonable basis therein to support the trial 
court's refusal to be convinced that the writ 
should be granted." 
Id. at 805, quoting Velasquez v. Pratt, 21 Utah 2d 229, 232, 443 
P.2d 1020, 1022 (1968)(citations omitted). In Codianna, this 
Court rejected the argument that ineffective assistance of 
counsel necessarily constitutes "unusual circumstances" that 
would allow petitioner to bypass the regular appellate process in 
favor of habeas corpus. The Court stated: 
To permit the inevitable instances of 
attorney oversight or ignorance to qualify 
for the "unusual circumstances" exception 
would allow that exception to swallow up the 
rule, thereby transforming habeas corpus from 
an extraordinary remedy into an alternative 
appeal mechanism in contravention of the 
finality of criminal judgments that is the 
settled policy of this state. 
Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1105. 
Likewise, in Zumbrunnen v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 428, 497 
P.2d 34 (1972), this Court stated! 
He [Zumbrunnen] pursued this petition, after 
his time for appeal from the conviction had 
expired. He claimed • . • his counsel, who 
assisted him at his request, was incompetent. 
[This point] could have been urged on a 
regular appeal. This court repeatedly has 
said the writ cannot be used as a substitute 
for such appeal. . . 
Id. at 35. 
Similarly, in Matthew v. Cook, 754 P.2d 666 (Utah 
1988), this Court said that "[plaintiff] did not show cause why 
he failed to follow the route of regular appellate procedure and 
that he suffered prejudice as a result of his default." Icl. at 
667. 
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In Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121 
(1967), this Court addressed a similar issue. In Bryant, 
petitioner claimed "that because of this inability to communicate 
he was not and could not be represented effectively by counsel." 
Id. at 122. The District Court denied the petition and this 
Court affirmed. .Id. at 122-23. In discussing the case this 
Court said: 
This proceeding is an attempt to do that 
which should not be done nor countenanced in 
our procedure: to turn habeas corpus into an 
appellate review. This is not its purpose, 
and it is not so intended. The regular steps 
of criminal procedure provided for in our law 
give adequate protections of the rights of 
one accused of crime and safeguards against 
conviction of the innocent. They afford full 
opportunity to present and have determined 
any matters of defense, and to make 
objections to any error or impropriety that 
may affect his rights. Moreover, after 
judgment is entered, there is assured a right 
of appeal within the proper time to seek 
redress for any such error or transgression 
of those rights. When this procedure has 
been followed the judgment should normally be 
final. It should not be subjected to a 
continual merry-go-round of collateral 
attacks upon various and specious pretexts as 
some courts are prone to permit nowadays. In 
our opinion such an inconsiderate attitude 
toward final judgments regularly arrived at 
by courts of competent jurisdiction robs the 
law of the dignity and respect it is entitled 
to. It tends to degrade the whole process of 
law enforcement and the administration of 
justice and thus to undermine the good order 
of society it is purposed to maintain. 
Id. at 122 (footnotes omitted). 
In a case similar to the one at bar, .this Court invoked 
the doctrine of waiver or procedural default in affirming the 
summary dismissal of a petition claiming ineffective counsel. In 
Hafen v. Morris, 632 P.2d 875 (Utah 1981), the defendant was 
_i o_ 
convicted and sentenced to prison. The defendant appealed and 
his conviction was affirmed. He then sought habeas review and 
claimed that his trial attorney "failed to honor his request to 
challenge a juror who appellant knew. [He] also claims that his 
trial attorney failed to raise that issue on appeal although 
appellant had so requested." Id. at 876. Naturally, in his 
post-conviction action he claimed "he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel. . . " Ici. The lower court 
dismissed his petition on the ground that he 
had waived any right to raise the issue of 
the failure of his attorney to challenge the 
juror. The court determined that it would 
not grant an evidentiary hearing on that 
issue since it could have been raised at 
appellant's trial or on appeal. . . . 
Id. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court and stated: 
We explained further, in Brown v. Turner, 21 
Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968), that "If the 
contention of error is something which is 
known or should be known to the party at the 
time the judgment was entered, it must be 
reviewed in the manner and within the time 
permitted by regular prescribed procedure, or 
the judgment becomes final and is not subject 
to further attack, except in some such 
unusual circumstances as we have mentioned 
above. Were it otherwise, the regular rules -
of procedure governing appeals and the 
limitations of time specified therein would 
be rendered impotent." 
Waiver was found in Schad v. Turner, supra, 
where the petitioner in a petition for habeas 
corpus attempted to raise as an issue that the 
District Attorney had exceeded the bounds of 
propriety in his cross-examination of the 
petitioner at the trial. We there observed that 
since that was an issue which could have been 
raised on the petitioner's former appeal of his 
case to this Court, we would not take cognizance 
of it on a later petition for habeas corpus. 
If the appellant's counsel did in fact fail to 
honor his request to challenge the juror, the 
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appellant had the adequate opportunity at the 
trial to have made complaint to the court. 
Furthermore, following his conviction that issue 
could have been raised by him in this Court in his 
appeal which pended in this Court for many months. 
In view of his silence, the trial judge correctly 
ruled that he had waived any claim of error in 
this regard. There are not here any of the 
"unusual circumstances" referred to in Bryant v. 
Turner, supra. 
Id. Thus, this Court held that Hafen had waived review of his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim because he failed to 
raise the issue at trial or while his direct appeal was pending. 
In the present case, petitioner has claimed a violation 
of his constitutional rights in that he alleges ineffective 
assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, denial of access 
to the courts and prejudice in his trial judge. An examination 
of these claims and allegations demonstrates that petitioner was 
not denied due process nor would it be unconscionable to not re-
examine his conviction. Petitioner had different counsel at 
trial and then during his appeal. His appellate counsel raised 
four issues, one involving ineffective assistance of counsel for 
failing to object to the giving of an "Allen" jury instruction, 
two claiming that the trial court erred by giving the instruction 
and by allowing a witness' preliminary hearing testimony to be 
read into the record at trial, and one claiming that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict. 
Petitioner's general claim on habeas that his trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance was raised on his direct appeal. 
The appellate brief in the original case explored the allegation 
that trial counsel and petitioner were at odds on the handling of 
his case. Petitioner presented an affidavit to this appellate 
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court listing the conflicts that he claims to have had with trial 
counsel. This Court stated in its decision on that appeal that 
petitioner's contentions were rejected for two reasons: 
First, it is based almost entirely on self-
serving affidavits that are not part of the 
record. For obvious reasons, we cannot 
accept after-the-fact claims that there was a 
conflict with counsel, unless the defendant 
has made his disagreement with counsel 
apparent on the record. 
State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987). The second 
reason given for rejecting petitioner's claim was that trial 
counsel's decision to accept the "Allen" charge was trial 
strategy and within counsel's prerogative to decide. Id. 
POINT II 
THE HABEAS COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT 
PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HIS 
TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE. 
As in petitioner's appeal, on habeas review he asked 
the District Court, and asks this Court now to review matters 
which are not in the record of the trial or the habeas 
evidentiary hearing. At the evidentiary hearing in the District 
Court, he did not present testimony nor evidence but merely 
argued his position and made statements to the court about his 
habeas claims (Habeas R. 264). Subsequently he submitted to the 
habeas court several "Supplemental Traverses" and "Affidavits" 
which evidently were intended to replace his deficiency in not 
presenting evidence at the hearing (Habeas R. 267-284, 286-370). 
None of the "traverses" or "affidavits" carry the weight of 
evidence nor do they raise matters which were not or could not 
have been raised on petitioner's direct appeal. 
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Petitioner's specific claims of ineffectiveness raised 
in his habeas petition were that trial counsel failed to conduct 
an investigation which would have shown that 1) the officers 
searched a Monte Carlo instead of a Chevelle or Malibu, 2) Myers 
was not a credible witness because his claims that he had served 
in the military, that he was starting his own business, that he 
worked for a firm in Omaha, Nebraska called "New Energy 
Consultants", that he had only met the victim for the first time 
that day, that he had never been convicted of a felony, and that 
he had walked to the bus depot and waited five minutes before 
calling police were false, and 3) Archuleta was not a credible 
witness because he had a "vendetta" against petitioner's family. 
The specific claim that trial counsel was deficient 
because she failed to conduct pretrial investigation is not 
supported by the trial record. The trial record shows that trial 
counsel called the Chief Investigator of the Salt Lake Legal 
Defenders Association as a witness to testify as to the time it 
would have taken Myers to walk from the scene of the shooting to 
the bus depot (Trial R. 589-595). His testimony directly 
challenged the credibility of the prosecution's eyewitness, 
Rickey Myers. Another investigator from the Salt Lake Legal 
Defenders Association, Gilbert Ramirez, testified as to efforts 
to locate Myers' employer and failing to find the business Myers 
had given as his employer (Trial R. 585). This also was a direct 
challenge to Myers' credibility. Trial counsel proffered, with 
the stipulation of the prosecution, the testimony of an agent of 
the Department of the Army to the effect that the Department had 
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searched and had not found any record of Myers having served in 
the Army (Trial R. 656). Obviously, pretrial investigation was 
done and trial counsel used the information gleaned from that 
investigation to challenge the credibility of Myers on cross-
examination (Trial R. 432-34). Petitioner's claim that other 
investigation could or should have been done or that further 
investigation would have changed the outcome of the trial is not 
supported by the record. 
As to petitioner's claims that Myers lied when he 
testified as to starting his own business, that he only met the 
victim for the first time that day, and that he had never been 
convicted of a felony, petitioner has not shown any of those 
statements to be false. There is no evidence to disprove Myers' 
claim that he was starting his own business and the trial record 
doesn't say (as petitioner claims) that the new business was a 
trucking company (Trial R. 379). Myers said only that he was in 
the process of starting his own business, then answered the 
prosecutor's question about what type of business he was 
typically in by saying "Trucking" (Trial R. 379). Petitioner 
seeks to challenge Myers' statement that he had only met the 
victim that day by citing to an affidavit by his wife, Ruth 
Medina, which is appended to his Brief but does not appear in the 
record of his habeas petition. That affidavit is without merit. 
Mrs. Medina allegedly quotes an Assistant Attorney General as 
saying that everyone knew that Myers and the victim had hung out 
together and that Myers had criminal records in Utah and 
elsewhere. There is no evidence to that effect from Bernard 
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Tanner, an Assistant Attorney General working in the Tax and 
Business Regulations Division. Mr. Tanner may have made those 
statements to Mrs. Medina but they are not proof that Myers was 
lying. There is no evidence that Mr. Tanner has personal 
knowledge of Myers' supposed criminal history and these 
statements fly in the face of the sworn testimony of Officer John 
Johnson who testified that a criminal history of Myers was 
obtained and showed that he had no convictions in Utah nor 
warrants from other states (Trial R. 496, 506, 508). There also 
was no evidence provided that Myers and the victim had known each 
other before March 31, 1984. Most of these issues were 
thoroughly explored and challenged by trial counsel at trial and 
were also raised by petitioner on his direct appeal and found to 
be without merit. There was no new evidence before the habeas 
court which supports petitioner's claim that Myers was lying 
under oath. 
Petitioner's claim that trial counsel was ineffective 
because the officers allegedly searched the wrong car is also 
without merit. Trial counsel was not present when petitioner 
gave consent for the search of his car nor when the officers 
conducted the search. While there is no testimony as to how the 
officers decided which car belonged to petitioner, it is 
difficult to believe that petitioner did not have some input as 
to which car was his. It is absurd to believe that the officers 
merely picked out a car at random near petitioner's house and 
searched it without establishing petitioner's possessory 
interest. Something or someone must have directed them to the 
black Monte Carlo as belonging to petitioner. It is interesting 
to note that petitioner did not raise this discrepancy in the 
cars at the time of trial. The officers clearly testified that 
they searched a black Chevrolet Monte Carlo (Trial R. 479, 516). 
Petitioner's relatives and friends testified that he drove a 
black Chevrolet Chevelle (Trial R. 254-60), although Gilbert 
Najera testified that petitioner had a couple of cars and he 
didn't know which car petitioner drove that night. The 
prosecutor asked if Najera saw any cars described as a "black 
Chevrolet Super sport Chevelle" and Najera replied that he 
"didn't pay any attention to any Camaro" (Trial R. 362-63). 
Petitioner himself testified that he was driving his 1972 black 
Chevelle (Trial R. 607) but then identified the registration for 
a Chevelle Malibu for introduction into evidence (Trial R. 608). 
After being present in court and hearing the testimony that the 
car searched was a Monte Carlo, petitioner never said that the 
bullet was not found in his car, either at trial or on appeal. 
Instead, he presented evidence from a cousin that the bullet may 
have come from a target shooting incident earlier in the year 
(Trial R. 595-99). Petitioner testified himself as to the target 
shooting claim (Trial R. 630, 636-39) but never raised the issue 
of the wrong car being searched. It is possible for the jury to 
have believed that the Chevelle car model and the Monte Carlo 
were similar and the confusion was only in the name and not in 
whether the car searched was petitioner's. The names of Monte 
Carlo, Chevelle, Malibu and Camaro were all given at one time or 
the other at the trial. The fact that Myers saw petitioner shoot 
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the victim was sufficient evidence to convict petitioner even if 
there was confusion about the make of the car. 
Petitioner's attempt through the "affidavits11 of Mark 
Velarde to "prove" that the car searched was not petitioner's 
must fail. Again, these "affidavits" are not evidence and, even 
if they were, they really don't tell the court anything. Velarde 
changes his "affidavits" as time goes on. In the March 14, 1988, 
"affidavit" he said that the Monte Carlo must belong to a friend 
of his whom he does not want to name, but who supposedly told him 
that his car was searched on the morning of April 1, 1984. On 
April 3, 1988, his "affidavit" says that he would have testified 
for petitioner at his trial that he, Velarde, is "almost 100% 
sure" that his friend's Monte Carlo was parked in front of 
petitioner's home. It is interesting that Velarde supposedly 
remembers this after four years and when he claims not to have 
known petitioner at the time that the search took place. Velarde 
appears to be a prison crony of petitioner's who now remembers an 
occurrence of four years ago when this "memory" can help 
petitioner. 
The claim that further pretrial investigation of Eli 
Archuleta, the State's rebuttal witness, would have produced a 
different result in the trial is also without merit. Archuleta 
was presented the last day of trial because he was not found 
until that time. When his presence was known, petitioner's trial 
counsel asked for, and received, time to speak with Archuleta 
(Trial R. 661). She spoke to him for 25-35 minutes which she 
indicated was plenty of time (Trial R. 661-62). She was able to 
effectively challenge Archuleta's testimony as he testified that 
he was on felony parole (Trial R. 663, 673) and that he had been 
granted immunity for testifying (Trial R. 664, 673-75). His 
confusion about when he had sold the gun to petitioner was 
thoroughly explored at trial and on petitioner's direct appeal. 
In addition, petitioner's trial counsel called a surrebuttal 
witness, a friend of petitioner's, who testified to the supposed 
-vendetta" against petitioner's family by Archuleta (Trial R. 
683). Calling other witnesses, such as Leonard Fernandez, 
petitioner's cousin and author of another "affidavit" (Habeas R. 
283-84), would have been merely cumulative and not added any 
substance to the vendetta claim. 
Petitioner presents an "affidavit" of Ronald Craig 
Warren, another prison buddy (Habeas R. 363-70). This 
"affidavit" purports to prove that Archuleta admitted lying on 
the stand in petitioner's trial. The happenstance of Warren 
being housed next to petitioner, then next to Archuleta, then 
back with petitioner is very fortuitous, to say the least. The 
"affidavit" does not say that Archuleta said that he was lying, 
only the "he knew he was in the wrong for doning (sic) it. . . ." 
That statement, if it really was made, could just as easily have 
meant that Archuleta was remorseful for testifying, having to 
"rat on", petitioner. The "affidavit" is not proof that 
Archuleta lied. 
Petitioner next claims ineffective assistance by 
appellate counsel because they allegedly neglected to notice 
these problems and raise them on appeal. As has been discussed, 
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appellate counsel did raise most of these issues on direct appeal 
and any other claims now raised by petitioner are without merit• 
POINT III 
THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT CLAIMED BY 
PETITIONER EITHER DID NOT OCCUR OR IS NOT IN 
THE RECORD TO ALLOW THIS COURT TO REVIEW. 
Petitioner claims that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by using perjured testimony. As the basis for his 
claim he raises the same issues as addressed in Point II above. 
As discussed there, petitioner has not proven that either Myers 
or Archuleta were lying. Without that proof, he has not shown 
that the prosecutor knew or should have known that these 
witnesses were lying. On the issue of Myers' alleged criminal 
record, it would also have to be shown that the officers who ran 
the check on his history were lying and that the prosecutor knew 
or should have known that they were. There is no evidence that 
that is the case. 
The allegation that the prosecutor injected 
impermissible racial slurs into his closing argument has no basis 
in the record. The closing arguments were not transcribed (which 
petitioner claims was also ineffective assistance) so this Court 
has no evidence before it that error occurred during closing 
argument. Petitioner submits with his brief a newspaper clipping 
which reports the closing arguments in the case. Even in the 
clipping there is no quote from the prosecutor calling petitioner 
a "macho Mexican1*. The article paraphrases the prosecutor as 
saying that "Medina was being macho with his friends the night of 
the party," The defense counsel is paraphrased as saying that 
"the prosecuting attorney had portrayed Medina as being macho 
just because he is Mexican. 'Being Mexican doesn't necessarily 
mean being macho.'" (Brief of Appellant, Exhibit 8). None of 
this is evidence that the prosecutor called petitioner a "macho 
Mexican" as he alleges. Given petitioner's misquotes from the 
trial transcript throughout his brief when he had that transcript 
in front of him, this Court should not accept his claim that the 
prosecutor made any such statement. 
Petitioner also alleges that the prosecutor 
intentionally concealed the make of the car searched until after 
trial and that trial counsel was in collusion with the prosecutor 
to conceal that information from petitioner. This argument is 
specious. The trial transcript clearly states the testimony 
about the model of the car searched and petitioner was present at 
trial and could hear the testimony of those witnesses. It can 
also be assumed that that information was divulged to 
petitioner's trial counsel as part of the police report given 
during discovery and was never concealed from anyone. 
POINT IV 
THE ISSUES RAISED BY PETITIONER IN HIS 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ARE EITHER DUPLICITOUS OR 
ARE EQUALLY WITHOUT MERIT. 
In his supplemental brief, petitioner raises many of 
the same issues raised in his original brief; in fact, pages 3 
through 11 are copies of petitioner's original brief. The only 
additional claims are that 1) petitioner's trial counsel was in 
collusion with the prosecution, 2) petitioner was denied access 
to the courts, and 3) the trial judge was prejudiced against 
petitioner. 
-23-
The claim that petitioner's trial counsel was in 
collusion with the prosecution is based on petitioner's claims 
about lack of investigation, the closing arguments, and a claim 
that trial counsel gave petitioner a bottle of whiskey during 
trial which he drank. He claims that while he was drunk his 
attorney waived all of his rights regarding the "Allen" charge 
against his wishes. The first two claims are addressed above and 
the last is not supported by any evidence. The issue of the 
supposed conflict between petitioner and counsel regarding the 
"Allen" charge was rejected by this Court during petitioner's 
direct appeal. 
Petitioner was not denied his access to the courts but 
was given his direct appeal and then was given an evidentiary 
hearing on his habeas petition. The fact that the habeas court 
did not accept any of his arguments (he presented no evidence) at 
the hearing did not deny him access to the court nor to due 
process. The habeas court heard his arguments and allowed him to 
file his multitudinous "traverses" and "affidavits" even after 
the hearing. A reading of those filings clearly supports the 
habeas court's findings that petitioner has not demonstrated 
ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel; has not 
demonstrated any newly discovered evidence; has not demonstrated 
an unfair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct; has not 
demonstrated what exculpatory evidence the prosecutor allegedly 
withheld; has not demonstrated that the prosecutor knowingly used 
perjured testimony; and has not demonstrated any improper 
statements by the prosecutor during closing arguments. 
Petitioner's final additional allegation is that the 
trial judge was prejudiced against him. For the proposition, he 
quotes Judge Frederick (Trial R. 548) implying that the court's 
statement had something to do with the previous testimony about 
the bullet found in petitioner's car. The statement by Judge 
Frederick was clearly referring to the discussion occurring at 
that point about the State's request to present the preliminary 
hearing testimony of an unavailable witness. Read in context, 
the statement does not show any prejudice on the part of Judge 
Frederick. 
Throughout his brief and supplemental brief, petitioner 
misquotes, misconstrues and misunderstands the law and the 
testimony given. Neither his arguments at his habeas hearing nor 
his supplemental filings with the court presented the evidence 
that the court needed if it were to rule in petitioner's favor. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, and any information which may 
be brought out on oral argument, the State asks this Court to 
affirm the sentencing of the lower court. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Q}' day of February, 
1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
GU 
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